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CAPITAL IS BACK: WEALTH-INCOME RATIOS IN RICH
COUNTRIES 1700–2010*
Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman
How do aggregate wealth-to-income ratios evolve in the long run and why?
We address this question using 1970–2010 national balance sheets recently
compiled in the top eight developed economies. For the United States, United
Kingdom, Germany, and France, we are able to extend our analysis as far back
as 1700. We find in every country a gradual rise‘ of wealth-income ratios in
recent decades, from about 200–300% in 1970 to 400–600% in 2010. In effect,
today’s ratios appear to be returning to the high values observed in Europe in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (600–700%). This can be explained by
a long-run asset price recovery (itself driven by changes in capital policies since
the world wars) and by the slowdown of productivity and population growth, in
line with the ¼ sg Harrod-Domar-Solow formula. That is, for a given net saving
rate s¼ 10%, the long-run wealth-income ratio  is about 300% if g¼ 3% and
600% if g¼ 1.5%. Our results have implications for capital taxation and regu-
lation and shed new light on the changing nature of wealth, the shape of the
production function, and the rise of capital shares. JEL Codes: E10, E20, D30,
D31, D33.
I. Introduction
This article addresses what is arguably one of the most basic
economic questions: how do wealth-income and capital-output
ratios evolve in the long run and why?
Until recently it was difficult to properly address this ques-
tion, because national accounts were mostly about flows, not
stocks. Economists had at their disposal a large body of historical
series on flows of output, income, and consumption—but limited
data on stocks of assets and liabilities. When needed, for example,
for growth accounting exercises, estimates of capital stocks were
typically obtained by cumulating past flows of saving and invest-
ment. Although suitable for some purposes, this procedure se-
verely limits the set of questions one can ask.
In recent years, the statistical institutes of nearly all de-
veloped countries have started publishing retrospective national
stock accounts, including annual and consistent balance sheets.
Following new international guidelines, the balance sheets report
*We are grateful to numerous seminar participants for their reactions. This
revised and shortened version also benefited from the comments of the editor and
three anonymous referees.
! The Author(s) 2014. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of President
and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email:
journals.permissions@oup.com
The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2014), 1255–1310. doi:10.1093/qje/qju018.
Advance Access publication on May 21, 2014.
1255
 at London School of econom
ics on Septem
ber 15, 2014
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
on the market value of all the nonfinancial and financial assets
and liabilities held by each sector of the economy (households,
government, and corporations) and by the rest of the world.
They can be used to measure the stocks of private and national
wealth at current market value.
This article makes use of these new balance sheets to estab-
lish a number of facts and analyze whether standard capital accu-
mulation models can account for these facts. We stress at the
outset that we are well aware of the deficiencies of existing balance
sheets. In many ways these series are still in their infancy. But
they are the best data we have to study wealth accumulation—a
question so important that we cannot wait for perfect data before
we start addressing it, and which has indeed been addressed in the
past by many authors using far less data than we presently have.
In addition, we feel that the best way for scholars to contribute to
future data improvement is to use existing balance sheets in a
conceptually coherent manner, so as to better identify their limi-
tations. Our article, therefore, can also be viewed as an attempt to
assess the internal consistency of the flow and stock sides of exist-
ing national accounts and to pinpoint the areas in which progress
needs to be made.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we put together a new
macro-historical data set on wealth and income, whose main
characteristics are summarized in Table I. To our knowledge, it
is the first international database to include long-run, homoge-
neous information on national wealth. The database is available
online, along with a comprehensive Data Appendix that precisely
documents the data construction process. For the eight largest
developed economies in the world—the United States, Japan,
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, and
Australia—we have official annual series covering the 1970–
2010 period. Through to the world wars, there was a lively trad-
ition of national wealth accounting in many countries. By com-
bining numerous historical estimates in a systematic and
consistent manner, we are able to extend our series as far back
as 1870 (Germany), 1770 (United States), and 1700 (United
Kingdom and France). The resulting database provides extensive
information on the structure of wealth, saving, and investment. It
can be used to study core macroeconomic questions—such as pri-
vate capital accumulation, the dynamics of the public debt, and
patterns in net foreign asset positions—altogether and over un-
usually long periods of time.
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Our second contribution is to exploit the database to estab-
lish a number of new results. We first document that wealth-
income ratios have been gradually rising in each of the top
eight developed countries over the past four decades, from
about 200–300% in 1970 to 400–600% in 2010 (Figure I).
Taking a long-run perspective, today’s ratios appear to be return-
ing to the high values observed in Europe in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, namely, about 600–700%, despite consider-
able changes in the nature of wealth (Figures II and III). In
the United States, the wealth-income ratio has also followed a
U-shaped pattern, but less marked (Figure IV).
To understand these dynamics, we provide detailed decom-
positions of wealth accumulation into volume effects (saving) and
relative price effects (real capital gains and losses). The results
show that the U-shaped evolution of European wealth-income
ratios can be explained by two main factors. The first is a long-
run swing in relative asset prices, which, we argue, was itself
largely driven by changes in capital policies in the course of the
twentieth century. Before World War I, capital markets ran un-
fettered. A number of anticapital policies were then put into
place, which depressed asset prices through to the 1970s. These
policies were gradually lifted from the 1980s on, contributing to
an asset price recovery.
The second key explanation for the return of high wealth-
income ratios is the slowdown of productivity and population
growth. According to the Harrod-Domar-Solow formula, in the
TABLE I
A NEW MACRO DATABASE ON INCOME AND WEALTH
Total period covered
in database
Annual
series
Decennial
estimates
United States 1770–2010 1869–2010 1770–2010
Japan 1960–2010 1960–2010
Germany 1870–2010 1870–2010
France 1700–2010 1896–2010 1700–2010
United Kingdom 1700–2010 1855–2010 1700–2010
Italy 1965–2010 1965–2010
Canada 1970–2010 1970–2010
Australia 1970–2010 1970–2010
Notes. Income and wealth database constructed by the authors using country national accounts (of-
ficial series and balance sheets and nonofficial historical estimates). See country Online Appendixes for
sources, methods, and detailed series.
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FIGURE II
Private Wealth-National Income Ratios in Europe, 1870–2010
Authors’ computations using country national accounts. Private
wealth¼non-financial assets + financial assetsfinancial liabilities (household
& non-profit sectors). Data are decennial averages (1910–1913 averages for
1910).
FIGURE I
Private Wealth-National Income Ratios, 1970–2010
Authors’ computations using country national accounts. Private
wealth¼non-financial assets + financial assetsfinancial liabilities (household
& non-profit sectors).
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FIGURE III
The Changing Nature of National Wealth: United Kingdom, 1700–2010
National wealth¼ agricultural land + housing + other domestic capital
goods + net foreign assets
FIGURE IV
Private Wealth-National Income Ratios, 1870–2010: Europe versus United
States
Authors’ computations using country national accounts. Private wealth¼
non-financial assets + financial assetsfinancial liabilities (household & non-
profit sectors). Data are decennial averages (1910–1913 averages for 1910
Europe).
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long run the wealth-income ratio  is equal to the net-of-
depreciation saving rate s divided by the income growth rate g.
So for a given saving rate s¼ 10%, the long-run  is about 300% if
g¼3% and about 600% if g¼ 1.5%. In a broad class of general
equilibrium models with endogenous saving, the steady-state
wealth-income ratio is also a decreasing function of the income
growth rate g.
This mechanism sheds light on the rise in the wealth-income
ratios of Europe and Japan, two economies where population and
productivity growth has slowed markedly: capital is back because
low growth is back. It also helps understand why wealth-income
ratios are lower in the United States, where population growth—
but not saving—is larger than in Europe. Last, the ¼ sg steady-
state formula seems to account reasonably well for the very long-
run dynamics of wealth accumulation. Over a few years and even
a few decades, valuation effects are of paramount importance.
But in the main developed economies, we find that today’s
wealth levels are reasonably well explained by 1870–2010
saving and income growth rates, in line with the workhorse
one-good model of capital accumulation. In the long run, there
seems to be no significant divergence between the price of con-
sumption and capital goods.
We stress, however, that despite our efforts we still face data
limitations when decomposing wealth accumulation in the very
long run. Our interpretations are subject to these limitations, and
we hope our findings will motivate new research on the historical
dynamics of asset prices. Furthermore, in some countries capital
gains—particularly on housing—explain a large part of the
recent rise of wealth-income ratios. It is only in the very long
run or at a very aggregate level (i.e., at a European rather than
country level) that relative price effects seem to wash out.
Our findings have implications for the future and for policy
making. First, the low wealth-income ratios of the mid-twentieth
century were due to special circumstances. The world wars and
anticapital policies destroyed a large fraction of the world capital
stock and reduced the market value of private wealth, which is
unlikely to happen again with free markets. By contrast, if
income growth slows down in the decades ahead, then wealth-
income ratios may become high pretty much everywhere. As long
as they keep saving sizable amounts (due to a mixture of bequest,
life cycle, and precautionary reasons), countries with low g are
bound to have high .
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The return of high wealth-income ratios is not bad in itself,
but it raises new issues about capital taxation and regulation.
Because wealth is always very concentrated (due in particular
to the cumulative and multiplicative processes governing
wealth inequality dynamics), high  implies than the inequality
of wealth, and potentially the inequality of inherited wealth, is
likely to play a bigger role for the overall structure of inequality in
the twenty-first century than it did in the postwar period. This
evolution might reinforce the need for progressive capital tax-
ation (Piketty, 2011, 2014; Piketty and Saez, 2013), which in
turn would require a high degree of international cooperation to
prevent wealth from hiding in offshore tax havens (Zucman,
2013). If international tax competition prevents these policy
changes from happening, one cannot exclude the development
of a new wave of antiglobalization and anticapital policies.
Furthermore, because s and g are largely determined by dif-
ferent forces, wealth-income ratios can vary a lot between coun-
tries. The implications for financial regulation are important.
With perfect capital markets, large differences in wealth-
income ratios potentially imply large net foreign asset positions,
which can create political tensions between countries. With im-
perfect capital markets and home portfolios bias, structurally
high wealth-income ratios can contribute to domestic asset
price bubbles. According to our computations, the wealth-
income ratio reached 700% at the peak of the Japanese bubble
of the late 1980s, and 800% in Spain in 2008–2009.1 Housing and
financial bubbles are potentially more devastating when the total
stock of wealth amounts to six to eight years of national income
rather than two to three years only. The fact that the Japanese
and Spanish bubbles are easily identifiable in our data set also
suggests that monitoring wealth-income ratios may help in de-
signing appropriate financial and monetary policy. In Japan and
Spain, most observers had noticed that asset price indexes were
rising fast. But in the absence of well-defined reference points,
it is always difficult for policy makers to determine when such
evolutions have gone too far and whether they should act.
1. See Online Appendix Figure A8. We do not include Spain in our main sample
of countries because the Bank of Spain balance sheets currently available only start
in 1987, and we want to be able to decompose wealth accumulation over a longer
period (at least 1970–2010).
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Wealth-income ratios and wealth accumulation decompositions
provide useful if imperfect reference points.
Last, our findings shed new light on the long-run changes in
the nature of wealth, the shape of the production function, and
the recent rise in capital shares. In the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century, capital was mostly land, so that there was limited
scope for substituting labor to capital. In the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, by contrast, capital takes many forms, to
an extent such that the elasticity of substitution between labor
and capital might well be larger than 1. With an elasticity even
moderately larger than 1, rising capital-output ratios can gener-
ate substantial increases in capital shares, similar to those that
have occurred in rich countries since the 1970s.
The article is organized as follows. Section II relates our work
to the existing literature. In Section III we define the key ratios
and present the accounting framework. We describe the 1970–
2010 evolution of wealth-income ratios in Section IV, before
decomposing the accumulation of wealth into volume and price
effects (Section V). In Section VI, we present decomposition re-
sults over a longer period (1870–2010) for a subset of countries
(United States, Germany, France, United Kingdom). We take an
even longer perspective in Section VII, in which we discuss the
changing nature of wealth in the United Kingdom, France, and
the United States since the eighteenth century. In Section VIII,
we compare the long-run evolution of capital-output ratios and
capital shares to discuss the changing nature of technology and
the pros and cons of the Cobb-Douglas approximation. Section IX
concludes.
II. Related Literature
II.A. Literature on National Wealth
To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first attempt
to gather a large set of national balance sheets to analyze the
long-run evolution of wealth-income ratios. For a long time, re-
search in this area was impeded by a lack of data. It is only in
1993 that the System of National Accounts, the international
standard for national accounting, first included guidelines for
wealth. In most rich countries, the publication of time series of
national wealth only began in the 1990s and 2000s. In a key
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country like Germany, the first official balance sheets were
released in 2010.
The recent emphasis on national wealth, however, largely
represents a return to older practice. Until the early twentieth
century, economists and statisticians were much more interested
in computing national wealth than national income and output.
The first national balance sheets were established in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries by Petty (1664) and
King (1696) in the United Kingdom and Boisguillebert (1695) and
Vauban (1707) in France. National wealth estimates then became
plentiful in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with
the work of Colqhoun (1815), Giffen (1889), and Bowley (1920) in
the United Kingdom; Foville (1893) and Colson (1903) in France;
Helfferich (1913) in Germany; King (1915) in the United States,
and dozens of other economists from all industrialized nations.
Although these historical balance sheets are far from perfect,
their methods are well documented and they are usually intern-
ally consistent. In many ways, it was also easier to estimate na-
tional wealth around 1900 than it is today: the structure of
property was simpler, with less financial intermediation and
cross-border positions.
Following the 1914–1945 capital shocks, the long tradition of
research on national wealth largely disappeared, partly because
of the new emphasis on short-run output fluctuations following
the Great Depression, and partly because the chaotic asset price
movements between the wars made the computation of the cur-
rent market value of wealth and the comparison with pre–World
War I estimates much more difficult. Although there has been
some effort to put together historical balance sheets in recent
decades, most notably by Goldsmith (1985, 1991), to date no sys-
tematic attempt has been made to relate the evolution of wealth-
income ratios to the magnitude of saving flows.2 The reason is
2. In particular, Goldsmith does not relate his wealth estimates to saving and
investment flows. He is mostly interested in the rise of financial intermediation,
that is the rise of gross financial assets and liabilities (expressed as a fraction of
national income), rather than in the evolution of the net wealth-income ratio.
Nineteenth-century authors like Giffen and Foville were fascinated by the huge
accumulation of private capital, but did not have much estimates of income, saving,
and investment, so they were not able to properly analyze the evolution of the
wealth-income ratio. Surprisingly enough, authors like Karl Marx—who were
much interested in the rise of capital and the possibility that  reaches very high
levels—largely ignored the literature on national wealth.
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probably that it is only recently that official balance sheets have
become sufficiently widespread to make the exercise meaningful.
II.B. Literature on Capital Accumulation and Growth
The lack of data on wealth in the aftermath of the 1914–1945
shocks did not prevent economists from studying capital accumu-
lation. In particular, Solow developed the neoclassical growth
model in the 1950s. In this model, the long-run capital-output
ratio is equal to the ratio between the saving rate and the
growth rate of the economy. As is well known, the ¼ sg formula
was first derived by Harrod (1939) and Domar (1947) using fixed-
coefficient production functions, in which case  is entirely given
by technology—hence the knife-edge conclusions about growth.3
The classic derivation of the formula with a flexible production
function Y¼F(K,L) involving capital-labor substitution, thereby
making  endogenous and balanced growth possible, is due to
Solow (1956). Authors of the time had limited national accounts
at their disposal to estimate the parameters of the formula. In
numerical illustrations, they typically took ¼ 400%, g¼ 2%, and
s¼ 8%. They were not entirely clear about the measurement of
capital, however.
Starting in the 1960s, the Solow model was largely applied
for empirical studies of growth (see Denison 1962; Jorgenson and
Griliches 1967; Feinstein 1978) and it was later on extended to
human capital (Barro 1991; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992). The
main difference between our work and the growth accounting
literature is how we measure capital. Because of the lack of bal-
ance sheet data, in the growth literature capital is typically mea-
sured indirectly by cumulating past investment flows and
attempting to adjust for changes in relative prices—what is
known as the perpetual inventory method. By contrast, we meas-
ure capital directly by using country balance sheets in which we
observe the actual market value of most types of assets: real
estate, equities (which capture the market value of corporations),
bonds, and so on. We are interested in what nonhuman private
capital is worth for households and in what public capital would
be worth if privatized. This notion is precisely what the
3. Harrod emphasized the inherent instability of the growth process, whereas
Domar stressed the possibility that  and s can adjust in case the natural growth
rate g differs from s.
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economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries aimed to
capture. We believe it is a useful and well-defined starting point.4
Compared to the capital stock estimates obtained by the per-
petual inventory method, country balance sheets have four im-
portant advantages. First, they include nonproduced assets, such
as land, which cannot be measured by cumulating past invest-
ment flows. It is critical to consistently account for nonproduced
assets if one wants to conduct Solow-type growth accounting ex-
ercises and compute the marginal product of capital (Caselli and
Feyrer 2007). Second, balance sheets rely for the most part on
observed market prices—obtained from real estate and financial
market transactions—while perpetual inventory method capital
stocks rely on estimated prices that suffer from a number of pit-
falls.5 Third, our measure of country capital stocks includes most
forms of intangible capital, contrary to older estimates. Last and
most important, country balance sheets now follow standardized
international definitions and are available for many countries
and over long periods of time. Market-value balance sheets
have their own deficiencies, but as we argue their advantages
vastly exceed their limitations. In our view, they ought to be
used more extensively in economic research.
In particular, now that national balance sheets are available,
we can see that some of the celebrated stylized facts on capital—
established when there was actually little data on capital—are
not that robust. The constancy of the capital-output ratio is not a
fact for Europe and Japan and is quite debatable for the United
States. Although this constancy is often seen as one of the key
regularities in economics, there has always been some confusion
about what the level of the capital-output ratio is supposed to be
(see Kaldor 1961; Samuelson 1970; Simon 1990; Jones and Romer
4. In the famous Cambridge controversy, the proponent of the U.K. view
argued that the notion of capital used in neoclassical growth models is not well
defined. In our view, much of the confusion in this controversy owes to the lack
of balance sheet data and to the difficulty of making comparisons with pre–World
War I capital stock estimates. It is natural to use relative market prices to aggregate
the various capital assets into national capital, just as it is natural to use relative
market prices to aggregate the various goods and services into national output.
5. Online Appendix Section A.1.2 provides a detailed discussion of the many
issued faced by the price estimates used in the perpetual inventory method: the
accounting of depreciation, quality improvement, aggregation bias, and so on.
Equity market prices are themselves not perfect; they can be very volatile in the
short run. But in the long run they are arguably the best data we have to capture the
market value of corporations’ capital stocks.
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2010). The data we now have suggest that the ratio is closer to 5–6
in most rich countries today than to the values of 3–4 often used
in macro models and textbooks.6
Our results also suggest that the focus on the possibility of
a balanced growth path that has long characterized academic
debates on capital accumulation (most notably during the
Cambridge controversy of the 1960s–1970s) has been somewhat
misplaced. It is fairly obvious that there can be a lot of capital-
labor substitution in the long run, and that many different  can
occur in steady state. But this does not imply that the economy
is necessarily in a stable or optimal state in any meaningful way.
High steady-state wealth-income ratios can go together with large
instability, asset price bubbles, and high degrees of inequality—
all plausible scenarios in mature, low-growth economies.
II.C. Literature on External Balance Sheets
Our work is close in spirit to the recent literature that docu-
ments and attempts to understand the dynamics of the external
balance sheets of countries (Gourinchas and Rey 2007; Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti 2007; Zucman 2013). We extend this line of work
to domestic wealth and to longer time periods: we document the
changing nature of domestic capital over time, and we investigate
the extent to which the observed aggregate dynamics can be ac-
counted for by saving flows and valuation effects. A key difference
is that our investigation is broader in scope: as we shall see, do-
mestic capital typically accounts for 90–110% of the total wealth
of rich countries today, whereas the net foreign asset position
accounts for 10% to +10% only. Nevertheless, external wealth
will turn out to play an important role in the dynamics of national
wealth, more spectacularly in the United States. The reason is
that gross foreign positions are much bigger than net positions,
thereby potentially generating large capital gains or losses at the
country level.7
6. Many estimates in the literature only look at the capital-output ratio in the
corporate sector (i.e., corporate capital divided by corporate product), in which case
ratios of 3 or even 2 are indeed in line with the data (see Online Appendix Figures
A70–A71). This, however, disregards the large stock of housing capital (as well as
noncorporate businesses and government capital), which we feel is inappropriate
(more on this below).
7. See Obstfeld (2012) and Gourinchas and Rey (2013) for recent papers sur-
veying the literature on this issue.
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II.D. Literature on Income and Wealth Inequalities
Last, this article is to a large extent the continuation of the
study of the long-run evolution of private wealth in France under-
taken by Piketty (2011). We extend Piketty’s analysis to many
countries, longer time periods, and public and foreign wealth.
However, we do not decompose aggregate wealth accumulation
into an inherited and dynastic wealth component on the one hand
and a life cycle and self-made wealth component on the other (as
Piketty does for France). Instead, we take the structure of saving
motives and the overall level of saving as given. In future re-
search, it would be interesting to extend our decompositions to
study the evolution of the relative importance of inherited versus
life cycle wealth in as many countries as possible. Ultimately, the
goal is also to introduce distributional trends in the analysis.8
III. Conceptual Framework and Methodology
III.A. Concepts and Definitions
The concepts we use are standard: we strictly follow the UN
System of National Accounts (SNA). For the 1970–2010 period,
we use official national accounts that comply with the latest inter-
national guidelines (SNA 1993, 2008). We take the data exactly as
published, except in the rare cases where the balance sheets de-
viate from the SNA, in which case we correct the data to ensure
consistency across countries.9 For the previous periods, we have
gathered a large number of historical balance sheets and income
series, which we have homogenized using the same concepts and
definitions as those used in the most recent official accounts.
Section A of the Data Appendix provides a thorough discussion
of the concepts and definitions used by the 1993 and 2008 SNA.
All the details on how we have used available historical estimates
to construct our own pre-1970 wealth series are provided in
the country-specific sections of the Data Appendix; see in particu-
lar sections B (devoted to the United States), D (Germany),
8. See Davies et al. (2010) for a study of the world distribution of personal
wealth.
9. For example, U.S. Flow of Funds balance sheets include durable goods,
contrary to other countries (see below), so to ensure consistency we subtract
durables.
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E (France), and F (United Kingdom). Here we provide the main
definitions.
Private wealth Wt is the net wealth (assets minus liabilities)
of households and nonprofit institutions serving households.10
Following SNA guidelines, assets include all the nonfinancial
assets—land, buildings, machines, and so on—and financial
assets, including life insurance and pensions funds, over
which ownership rights can be enforced and that provide
economic benefits to their owners. Pay-as-you-go social security
pension wealth is excluded, just like all other claims on future
government expenditures and transfers (like education expenses
for one’s children and health benefits).11 Durable goods owned
by households, such as cars and furniture, are excluded as
well.12 As a general rule, all assets and liabilities are valued at
their prevailing market prices. Corporations are included in pri-
vate wealth through the market value of equities and corporate
bonds. Unquoted shares are typically valued on the basis of
observed market prices for comparable, publicly traded
companies.
We similarly define public (or government) wealth Wgt as the
net wealth of public administrations and government agencies. In
available balance sheets, public nonfinancial assets like admin-
istrative buildings, schools, and hospitals are valued by cumulat-
ing past investment flows and upgrading them using observed
real estate prices.
We define market-value national wealth Wnt as the sum of
private and public wealth:
Wnt¼Wt þWgt:
10. The main reason for including nonprofit institutions serving households
(NPISHs) in private wealth is that the frontier between individuals and private
foundations is not always clear. The net wealth of NPISHs is usually small, and
always less than 10% of total net private wealth: currently it is about 1% in France,
3–4% in Japan, and 6–7% in the United States; see online Appendix Table A65. The
household sector also includes unincorporated businesses.
11. In any case, such claims would wash out for the computation of national
wealth—which we view as a more meaningful concept than private wealth—since
they would count as assets for households and liabilities for the government.
12. The value of durable goods appears to be relatively stable over time (about
30–50% of national income, i.e., 5–10% of net private wealth). See for instance
Online Appendix Table US.6f for durable goods in the United States.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS1268
 at London School of econom
ics on Septem
ber 15, 2014
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
National wealth can also be decomposed into domestic capital
and net foreign assets:
Wnt¼Kt þNFAt:
Domestic capital Kt can in turn be decomposed as the sum of
agricultural land, housing, and other domestic capital (including
the market value of corporations, and the value of other nonfi-
nancial assets held by the private and public sectors, net of their
liabilities).
An alternative measure of the wealth of corporations is the
total value of corporate assets net of nonequity liabilities, what
we call the corporations’ book value. We define residual corporate
wealth Wct as the difference between the book value of corpor-
ations and their market value (which is the value of their equi-
ties). By definition, Wct is equal to 0 when Tobin’s Q—the ratio
between market and book values—is equal to 1. In practice there
are several reasons Tobin’s Q can be different from 1, so that
residual corporate wealth is at times positive, at times
negative. We define book-value national wealth Wbt as the sum
of market-value national wealth and residual corporate wealth:
Wbt¼Wnt þWct¼Wt þWgt þWct. Although we prefer our market-
value concept of national wealth (or national capital), both defin-
itions have some merit, as we shall see.13
Balance sheets are constructed by national statistical insti-
tutes and central banks using a large number of census-like
sources, in particular reports from financial and nonfinancial cor-
porations about their balance sheet and off-balance-sheet pos-
itions, and housing surveys. The perpetual inventory method
usually plays a secondary role. The interested reader is referred
to the Online Appendix for a precise discussion of the methods
used by the leading rich countries.
13. Wbt corresponds to the concept of ‘‘national net worth’’ in the SNA (see Data
Appendix A.4.2). In this article, we propose to use ‘‘national wealth’’ and ‘‘national
capital’’ interchangeably (and similarly for ‘‘domestic wealth’’ and ‘‘domestic cap-
ital,’’ ‘‘foreign wealth’’ and ‘‘foreign capital,’’ and ‘‘private wealth’’ and ‘‘private cap-
ital’’) and to specify whether one uses ‘‘market value’’ or ‘‘book value’’ aggregates
(unless specified otherwise, we use ‘‘market value’’ concepts). Nineteenth-century
authors such as Giffen and Foville also used ‘‘national wealth’’ and ‘‘national cap-
ital’’ interchangeably. The difference is that they viewed market values as the only
possible value, whereas we recognize that both definitions have some merit (see the
discussion on Germany later).
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Regarding income, the definitions and notations are stand-
ard. Note that we always use net-of-depreciation income and
output concepts. National income Yt is the sum of net domestic
output and net foreign income: Yt¼Ydt þ rtNFAt.14 Domestic
output can be thought as coming from some production function
that uses domestic capital and labor as inputs: Ydt¼FðKt;LtÞ.
We are particularly interested in the evolution of the private
wealth–national income ratio t¼WtYt and of the (market-value)
national wealth–national income ratio nt¼WntYt . In a closed
economy—and more generally in an open economy with a zero
net foreign position—the national wealth–national income ratio
nt is the same as the domestic capital-output ratio kt¼ KtYdt.
15 In
case public wealth is equal to 0, then both ratios are also equal to
the private wealth–national income ratio: t¼nt¼kt. At the
global level, the world wealth-income ratio is always equal to
the world capital-output ratio.
We are also interested in the evolution of the capital share
t¼rt KtYdt¼rtkt, where rt is the average rate of return on domestic
capital. With imperfect capital markets, rt can substantially vary
across assets. With perfect capital markets and no aggregate un-
certainty, rt is the same for all assets and is equal to the marginal
product of capital. With a Cobb-Douglas production function
FðKt;LtÞ¼Kt L1t , and a closed economy setting, the capital
share is entirely set by technology: t¼rtkt¼. A higher capital-
output ratio kt is exactly compensated by a lower capital return
rt¼ kt, so that the product of the two is constant. In an open econ-
omy setting, the world capital share is also constant and equal to
, and the world rate of return is also given by rt¼ kt, but the
countries with higher-than-average wealth-income ratios invest
part of their wealth in other countries, so that for them the share
of capital in national income rt
Wt
Yt
¼rtt is larger than .
14. National income also includes net foreign labor income and net foreign pro-
duction taxes—both of which are usually negligible.
15. In principle, one can imagine a country with a zero net foreign asset position
(so thatWnt¼Kt) but nonzero net foreign income flows (so thatYt 6¼Ydt). In this case
the national wealth-national income ratio nt will slightly differ from the domestic
capital-output ratio kt. In practice today, differences between Yt and Ydt are very
small—national incomeYt is usually between 97% and 103% of domestic outputYdt
(see Online Appendix Figure A57). Net foreign asset positions are usually small as
well, so that the capital-output ratio kt turns out to be usually close to the national
wealth-income ratio nt in the 1970–2010 period (see Online Appendix Figure A67).
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With a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function, much depends on whether the capital-labor elasticity of
substitution  is larger or smaller than 1. If  > 1, then as kt
rises, the fall of the marginal product of capital rt is smaller
than the rise of kt, so that the capital share t¼rtkt is an increas-
ing function of kt. Conversely, if  < 1, the fall of rt is bigger than
the rise of kt, so that the capital share is a decreasing function of
kt.
16 Because we include all forms of capital assets into our ag-
gregate capital concept K (including housing), the aggregate elas-
ticity of substitution  should be interpreted as resulting from
both supply forces (producers shift between technologies with dif-
ferent capital intensities) and demand forces (consumers shift
between goods and services with different capital intensities,
including housing services versus other goods and services).17
III.B. The One-Good Wealth Accumulation Model
Wealth accumulation between time t and t+ 1 can always be
decomposed into a volume effect and a relative price effect:
Wntþ1¼Wnt þ St þ KGt, where Wnt is the market value of national
wealth at time t, St is the net-of-depreciation national saving flow
between time t and t+ 1 (volume effect), and KGt is the capital
gain or loss between time t and t+ 1 (relative price effect). In the
one-good model of wealth accumulation, and more generally in a
model with a constant relative price between capital and con-
sumption goods, there is no relative price effect (KGt¼0). The
national wealth-income ratio nt¼WntYt is given by the following
equation:
ntþ1¼
1þ gwst
1þ gt nt;
16. A CES production function is given by: FðK;LÞ¼ðaK 1 þ ð1 aÞL1 Þ 1. As
!1, the production function becomes linear, that is, the return to capital is in-
dependent of the quantity of capital (this is like a robot economy where capital can
produce output on its own). As ! 0, the production function becomes putty-clay,
that is, the return to capital falls to 0 if the quantity of capital is slightly above the
fixed proportion technology. We return to this discussion in Section VII.
17. Excluding housing from wealth strikes us an inappropriate, first because it
typically represents about half of the capital stock, and then because the frontier
with other capital assets is not always clear. In particular, the same assets can be
reallocated between housing and business uses. Note also that official balance
sheets treat housing assets owned by corporations (and sometime those rented by
households) as corporate capital assets.
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where 1þ gwst¼1þ Stnt¼ saving-induced wealth growth rate;
1þ gt¼ Ytþ1Yt ¼ growth rate of national income; and st¼
St
Yt
¼net-of-
depreciation national saving rate (domestic + net foreign saving).
In the long run, with a fixed saving rate st¼ s and growth rate
gt¼ g, the steady-state national wealth-income ratio is given by
the Harrod-Domar-Solow formula:
nt!n¼
s
g
:
Should we use gross-of-depreciation saving rates rather than
net rates, the steady-state formula would be n¼ sðgþÞ with s the
gross saving rate, and  the depreciation rate expressed as a pro-
portion of the wealth stock. We find it more transparent to ex-
press everything in terms of net saving rates and use the sg
formulation, so as to better focus on the saving versus capital
gain decomposition. Both formulas are equivalent and require
the same data.18
The sg formulation also applies to the capital-output ratio k,
with the only difference that for k the saving rate s to take into
consideration is the domestic saving rate (i.e., national saving
minus net foreign saving19) and g is the growth rate of domestic
output (i.e., national income minus net foreign income).
The steady-state formula ¼ sg is a pure accounting equation. If
the saving rate is s¼10%, and if the economy grows at rate g¼2%,
then in the long run the wealth-income ratio has to be equal to
¼ 500%, because it is the only ratio such that wealth rises at the
same rate as income: gws¼ s¼2%¼g. The formula holds in
the steady state of any micro-founded model, independently of
the nature of saving motives. In models where saving is exogenous,
the long-run wealth-income ratio is obviously a decreasing func-
tion of g. Importantly, however, the negative relationship between
steady-state  and g also holds true in a very large class of models
18. Online Appendix Table A84 provides cross-country data on depreciation.
Detailed series on gross saving, net saving, and depreciation, by sector of the econ-
omy, are in Online Appendix Tables US.12c, JP.12c, and so on. Whether one writes
down the decomposition of wealth accumulation using gross or net saving, one
needs depreciation series.
19. Net foreign saving equals the current account balance plus net foreign cap-
ital transfers (which are usually negligible) minus net errors and omissions in the
balance of payments.
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in which s is endogenous.20 It holds true, in particular, in different
variants of the ‘‘bequest-in-the-utility-function’’ model;21 in over-
lapping generations models;22 in the dynastic, infinite-horizon
model;23 and in most endogenous growth models.24 In all those
models, a growth slowdown—due to a decrease in population
growth, productivity growth, or both—leads to higher capital-
output and wealth-income ratios in the long run.
III.C. The Two-Good Model: Volume versus Relative Price
Effects
The steady-state ¼ sg formula only relies on the assumption
that there is no change in the relative price between capital and
consumption goods over time. In practice, relative asset price ef-
fects often vastly dominate volume effects in the short run, and
sometimes in the medium run as well. One key issue addressed in
this article is whether relative price effects also matter for the
analysis of long-run wealth accumulation. There are many rea-
sons they could matter, particularly if the speed of technical pro-
gress is not the same for capital and consumption goods.
One extreme case would be a two-good model in which the vol-
ume of capital is fixed: Vt¼V (say, fixed land supply). The market
value of capital if given by Kt¼ qtV, where qt is the price of the
capital good (say, land price per acre) relative to the consumption
20. For more details, see the working paper version of this article, Piketty and
Zucman (2013, section 3).
21. In such models, the saving rate parameter s follows directly from the
strength of the taste for bequest or wealth in the utility function.
22. The saving rate s is then determined—among other things—by the number
of years spent in retirement and the generosity of the public pension system.
23. In this model, each dynasty maximizes
P
t0
UðctÞ
ð1þÞt. The long-run rate of
return is entirely determined by preference parameters and the growth rate:
rt!r¼ þ g, where  0 is the curvature of the utility function UðcÞ¼ c1ð1Þ ( >1
is usually assumed to be more realistic). The steady-state saving rate is equal to
s¼ gr ¼ gðþgÞ, where ¼ r is the capital share. Intuitively, a fraction gr of capital
income is saved in the long run, so that dynastic wealth grows at the same rate g
as national income. The saving rate s¼ s(g) is an increasing function of the growth
rate, but rises less fast than g, so that the steady-state wealth-income ratio ¼ sg
decreases with g. With a Cobb-Douglas production function (fixed capital share),
the wealth-income ratio is given by ¼ r¼ ðþgÞ and takes its maximum value ¼ 
for g¼ 0.
24. In endogenous growth models with imperfect international capital flows,
the growth rate might rise with the saving rate, but it will usually rise less than
proportionally. It is only in the AK closed-economy model that the growth rate rises
proportionally with the saving rate.
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good. Assume fixed population and labor supply and positive
labor productivity growth g> 0. Then one can easily see that
the relative price qt will rise at the same pace as output and
income in the long run, so that the market value of capital rises
as fast as output and income: there are positive capital gains in
the steady state. By construction, there is no saving at all in this
model (since the capital good is in fixed supply), and the rise in the
value of capital is entirely due to a relative price effect.25 This is
the opposite extreme of the one-good model, whereby the rise in
the value of capital is entirely due to a volume effect.
In practice, there are all sorts of intermediate cases between
these polar cases: in the real world, volume effects matter, but so
do relative price effects. Our approach is to let the data speak. We
decompose the evolution of the national wealth-income ratio into
two multiplicative components (volume and relative price) using
the following accounting equation:
ntþ1¼
ð1þ gwstÞð1þ qtÞ
1þ gt nt;
where 1þ gwst¼1þ Stnt¼ saving-induced wealth growth rate;
1 + qt¼ capital-gains-induced wealth growth rate; and 1þ gt¼
Ytþ1
Yt
¼ growth rate of national income.
1 +qt is the real rate of capital gain or loss (i.e., the excess of
asset price inflation over consumer price inflation) and can be
estimated as a residual. We do not try to specify where qt comes
from (one can think of stochastic production functions for capital
and consumption goods, with different rates of technical progress
in the two sectors), and we infer it from the data at our disposal on
nt; . . . ; ntþn; st; . . . ; stþn, and gt; . . . ; gtþn. In effect, if we observe
that the wealth-income ratio rises too fast compared to recorded
saving, we record positive real capital gains qt. Although we tend
to prefer the multiplicative decomposition of wealth accumula-
tion (which is more meaningful over long time periods), we also
present additive decomposition results. The disadvantage of addi-
tive decompositions (which are otherwise simpler) is that they
tend to overweight recent years. By construction, our residual
capital gains q are the same as those found in the income-
wealth reconciliation accounts published by a growing number
25. See the working paper version of this article, Piketty and Zucman (2013),
sections 3.3. and 3.4.
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of statistical agencies, with the only difference that q is net of
consumer price inflation.26
In the next sections, we present the main descriptive statis-
tics for private wealth, national wealth, and domestic capital, as
well as the decomposition results for national wealth (additional
decomposition results are in Online Appendix K). We start with
the 1970–2010 period before moving to longer periods of time.
IV. The Rise of Wealth-Income Ratios 1970–2010
IV.A. Private Wealth-Income Ratios
Private wealth-income ratios have gradually increased in
rich countries since 1970, from about 200–300% in 1970 to
about 400–600% today (Figure I). In top of this general trend,
there are interesting cross-country variations. Within Europe,
the French and U.K. trajectories are comparable: in both coun-
tries, private wealth rose from about 300% of national income in
1970 to about 550% in 2010. In Italy, the rise was even more
spectacular, from less than 250% in 1970 to more than 650%
today. In Germany, the rise was proportionally larger than in
France and the United Kingdom, but the levels of private
wealth appear to be significantly lower than elsewhere: 200% of
national income in 1970, little more than 400% in 2010. The rela-
tively low level of German wealth at market value is an interest-
ing puzzle, on which we return. At this stage, we note that we are
unable to identify any methodological or conceptual difference in
the work of German statisticians (who apply the same SNA guide-
lines as everybody else) that could explain the gap with other
European countries.27
26. In the United States, for example, the Bureau of Economic Analysis pub-
lishes a set of integrated macroeconomic accounts that combine their national
income and product accounts (for income) and the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow
of Funds (for wealth). For the recent decades, all the U.S. series in our database
come from the integrated macro accounts, so that by construction the residual cap-
ital gains we report are consistent with those presented in these accounts.
27. See Online Appendix D on Germany. We made sure that the trend is un-
affected by German unification in 1990. The often noted difference in home owner-
ship rates between Germany and other European countries is not an explanation
for the lower wealth-income ratio. For a given saving rate, one can purchase differ-
ent types of assets, and there is no general reason housing should deliver higher
capital gains than financial assets.
CAPITAL IS BACK 1275
 at London School of econom
ics on Septem
ber 15, 2014
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Outside Europe, national trajectories also display interesting
variations. In Japan, private wealth rose sharply from less than
300% of national income in 1970 to almost 700% in 1990, then fell
abruptly in the early 1990s and stabilized around 600%. The 1990
Japanese peak is widely regarded as the archetype of an asset
price bubble, and probably rightly so. But if we look at the
Japanese trajectory from a longer run, cross-country perspective,
it is yet another example of the 1970–2010 rise of wealth-income
ratios—fairly close to Italy in terms of magnitude. In the United
States, private wealth rose from slightly more than 300% of na-
tional income in 1970 to almost 500% in 2007, but then fell
abruptly to about 400% in 2010—so that the total 1970–2010
rise is the smallest in our sample. (The U.S. wealth-income
ratio is now rising again, so this might change in the near
future.) In other countries the wealth-income ratio stabilized or
fell relatively little during the 2008–2010 financial crisis.28
The rise in private wealth–national income ratios would
be even more spectacular should we use disposable personal in-
come—that is, national income minus taxes plus cash transfers—
at the denominator. Disposable income was over 90% of national
income until 1910, then declined to about 80% in 1970 and to
75–80% in 2010, in particular because of the rise of freely pro-
vided public services and in-kind transfers such as health and
education. As a consequence, the private wealth–disposable
income ratio is well above 700% in a number of countries in
2010, while it was below 400% everywhere in 1970.29 Whether
one should divide private wealth by national or disposable income
is a matter of perspective. If one aims to compare the monetary
amounts of income and wealth that individuals have at their
disposal, then looking at the ratio between private wealth and
disposable income seems more appropriate. But to compare pri-
vate wealth-income ratios over long periods of time and across
28. With the interesting exception of Spain, where private wealth fell with a
comparable magnitude as in the United States since 2007 (i.e., by the equivalent of
about 50–75% of national income, or 10–15% of initial wealth).
29. See Online Appendix Figure A9. Should we include durable goods in our
wealth definition, then wealth-income ratios would be even higher—typically by
the equivalent about 50% of national income. However, the value of durable goods
seems to be approximately constant over time as a fraction of national income, so
this would not significantly affect the upward trend.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS1276
 at London School of econom
ics on Septem
ber 15, 2014
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
countries, it is more justified to look at economic values and there-
fore to divide private wealth by national income.30
IV.B. From Private to National Wealth
We now move from private to national wealth—the sum of
private and government wealth—which in our view is a more
meaningful and comprehensive concept of wealth. In rich coun-
tries, net government wealth has always been relatively small
compared to private wealth, and it has declined since 1970,
as Figure V illustrates. This decline is due to privatizations—
leading to a reduction in government assets—and an increase
in public debt.
For example, in the United States, as well as in Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom, net government wealth was
around 50–100% of national income in the 1970s–1980s, and is
now close to 0. In Italy, net government wealth became negative
in the early 1980s, and is now below 50%; in Japan, it was his-
torically larger—up to about 100% of national income in 1990—
but fell sharply during the 1990s–2000s and is now close to 0.
Australia is the only country in our sample with persistently
and significantly positive net government wealth.
Although there are data imperfections, the fall in government
wealth appears to be much smaller than the rise of private wealth.
As a result, national wealth has increased a lot, from 250–400%
of national income in 1970 to 400–650% in 2010 (Figure VI).31
30. In the end it really depends on how one views government-provided services
(and in our database, we provide both ratios). If one assumes that government
expenditures are useless, and that the rise of government during the twentieth
century has limited the ability of private individuals to accumulate private
wealth, then one should use disposable income as the denominator. But to the
extent that government expenditures are mostly useful (in the absence of public
spending in health and education, individuals would have to had to pay at least as
much to buy similar services on the market), it seems more justified to use national
income. One additional advantage is that national income tends to be better mea-
sured. Disposable income can display large time-series and cross-country vari-
ations for purely definitional reasons. In European countries disposable income
typically jumps from 70% to about 80% of national income if one includes in-kind
health transfers (such as insurance reimbursements) and to about 90% if one in-
cludes all in-kind transfers (education, housing, etc.). See Online Appendix Figure
A65.
31. Should we include claims on future government spending in wealth, private
wealth would be higher and government wealth lower, leaving national wealth
unchanged.
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FIGURE VI
National versus Foreign Wealth, 1970–2010
Authors’ computations using country national accounts. Net foreign
wealth¼net foreign assets owned by country residents in rest of the world
(all sectors).
FIGURE V
Private versus Government Wealth, 1970–2010
Authors’ computations using country national accounts. Government
wealth¼non-financial assets + financial assets liabilities of the government
sector.
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In Italy, for instance, net government wealth fell by the equivalent
of about one year of national income, but net private wealth rose by
over four years of national income, so that national wealth
increased by the equivalent of over three years of national income.
IV.C. From National Wealth to Domestic Capital
Last, our database provides evidence on the evolution of the
structure of national wealth. National wealth is the sum of do-
mestic capital and net foreign wealth. The first basic fact is that
net foreign wealth—whether positive or negative—has generally
been a relatively small part of national wealth in rich countries
throughout the 1970–2010 period (see Figure VI). However,
Japan and Germany have accumulated sizable positive net for-
eign positions in the 1990s–2000s, due to their large trade sur-
pluses. In the early 2010s, both countries own between 40% and
70% of national income in net foreign assets. Although Japan’s
and Germany’s net foreign positions are still substantially smal-
ler than the positions reached by the United Kingdom and France
around 1910, they are starting to be substantial. The German
position is rising fast. As a result, in Japan and Germany, the
rise in net foreign assets represents more than a quarter of the
total rise of the national wealth-income ratio.
In most of the other countries in our database, by contrast,
recorded net foreign positions are currently slightly negative—
typically between 10% and 30% of national income—and have
been declining.32 So for those countries, the rise in the domestic
capital-output ratio k has been larger than the rise in the na-
tional wealth-income ratio n. For example, the capital-output
ratio was about 400% in the United States in 1970 and reached
460% in 2010.33
As we already noted, our measure of the capital-output ratio
k based on balance sheet data differs from (and is arbuably more
comparable over time and across countries than) previously avail-
able estimates obtained by the perpetual inventory method
32. However, the official net foreign asset positions do not include the sizable
assets held by rich country residents in tax havens. In all likelihood, including these
assets would turn the rich world’s total net foreign asset position from negative to
positive. The improvement would be particularly large for Europe (Zucman 2013).
33. See Online Appendix Table A51 and Appendix Figure A67.
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(PIM). There are two main reasons for this discrepancy: different
valuations of housing capital and of corporations’ assets.34
In balance sheets, real estate is measured at its current
market value, using censuses and observed market prices. By
contrast, PIM estimates only capture the value of ‘‘structures,’’
and this value is obtained indirectly by cumulating past real
estate investments, adjusting for the evolution of the relative
price of construction (in a way that makes it difficult to properly
account for changes in quality). This procedure misses a large
fraction of the value of the housing stock.35 It fails to capture
the large increase in housing wealth that has happened since
1970 (with notable variations across countries). As Table II
shows, the rise of housing at market value accounts for virtually
all of the increase in k in the United Kingdom, France, and
Canada, for about two-thirds of the increase in the United
States, and about half in Japan.36
Second, in our benchmark measure of the capital-output
ratio, corporate capital is measured through the market value
of equities, while in older estimates corporate capital is at
book value (i.e., based on PIM estimates of corporations’ non-
financial assets). Tobin’s Q ratios between market and book
values were much below 1 in the 1970s and are closer to 1 (and
34. Section A.4.5 of the Data Appendix provides a detailed reconciliation on the
basis of the U.S. case. A third and less important reason is that balance sheets
include inventories and valuables, following international guidelines, whereas
PIM estimates of the capital stock generally do not.
35. The gap between the balance sheet and the PIM-based measures of real
estate includes the value of land underlying buildings, as well as any measurement
error on any side, and all cumulated changes in market-value real estate prices that
cannot be attributed to the evolution of construction costs. In the United States, the
gap amounts to about 60% of domestic output in 2010. Whether this should be
interpreted as the value of land is unclear, given the imperfections of the price
data used in PIM estimates and the fact that the distinction between structures
and land is somewhat arbitrary.
36. One caveat is that the frontier between housing and other capital goods is
not always entirely clear. Sometimes the same buildings are reallocated between
housing and offices, and housing services can be provided by hotels and real estate
companies. Also, the various countries do not always use the same methods and
concepts (e.g., in Japan, tenant-occupied housing is partly counted in other domes-
tic capital, and we could not fully correct for this). This is an area where progress
still needs to be made. Online Appendix A.9 pinpoints the key areas in which we
believe national accounts could be improved.
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at times above 1) in the 1990s–2000s.37 As a result, measured at
market value, domestic capital goods other than housing have
significantly contributed to the rise of k in a number of countries,
most spectacularly Japan and Italy (Table II).
Which measure of the corporate capital stock, market or
book, is more appropriate? Both have their merits. Take the
case of Germany. Tobin’s Q is low: it has remained around 0.5
since the 1970s, contrary to the United Kingdom and the
United States. One interpretation is a ‘‘stakeholder effect’’: share-
holders of German companies do not have full control of company
assets—they share their voting rights with workers’ representa-
tives and sometime regional governments—which might push
TABLE II
DOMESTIC CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN RICH COUNTRIES, 1970–2010: HOUSING VERSUS
OTHER DOMESTIC CAPITAL (%)
1970 domestic
capital/national
income ratio
2010 domestic
capital/national
income ratio
1970–2010 rise in
domestic capital/
national
income ratio
Incl.
housing
Incl. other
domestic
capital
Incl.
housing
Incl. other
domestic
capital
Incl.
housing
Incl. other
domestic
capital
United States 399 456 57
142 257 182 274 41 17
Japan 356 548 192
131 225 220 328 89 103
Germany 305 377 71
129 177 241 136 112 41
France 340 618 278
104 236 371 247 267 11
United Kingdom 359 548 189
98 261 300 248 202 13
Italy 247 640 392
107 141 386 254 279 113
Canada 325 422 97
108 217 208 213 101 4
Australia 410 655 244
172 239 364 291 193 52
37. See Online Appendix Figure A92 and Appendix Table A78. For example, in
2010, the value of the U.S. corporate capital stock is approximately the same
whether one looks at equity market prices or at the current cost of corporate capital
goods as estimated by BEA statisticians. That is, Tobin’s Q is around 1.
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Q below 1.38 If that is true, measuring corporate capital stocks at
book value might be desirable for some purposes (e.g., for growth
accounting), so in our database we also report series with corpor-
ate capital at book value. There are, however, issues with book-
value estimates (one of which being that intangible capital is
imperfectly accounted for) that lead us to view market values
as probably more informative in the long run.39 Whether one
uses book or market values for corporate capital, the capital-
output ratio has increased markedly in all rich countries since
the 1970s.40
V. Decompositions of 1970–2010 Wealth Accumulation
V.A. Growth Rates versus Saving Rates
How can we account for the rise and cross-country variations
of national wealth-income ratio? According to the one-good cap-
ital accumulation model, wealth-income ratios are driven by two
key forces: the saving rate s and the income growth rate g. So it is
useful to have in mind the magnitude of 1970–2010 growth and
saving rates. The basic fact is that both rates vary widely across
countries and seem largely unrelated (Tables III–IV), which cre-
ates room for wide, multidimensional variations in wealth-
income ratios across countries.
Variations in income growth rates are mostly due to vari-
ations in population growth. Over 1970–2010, average per
capita growth rates have been virtually the same in all rich
38. In Germany, book-value national wealth is substantially above market-
value national wealth (about five years of national income instead of four years).
The opposite occurs in the United Kingdom.
39. See Online Appendix Section A.1.2. The fact that intangible capital is not
fully accounted tends to bias PIM-corporate capital stocks downward. Other meas-
urement issues, however, tend to bias them upward, in particular errors in price
deflators and problems in accounting for the assets of firms going out of business
(which sometimes incorrectly continue to be counted in the capital stock). Overall, it
seems that PIM estimates of corporations’ capital stocks have historically tended to
be overestimated. Quite puzzlingly, indeed, in most countries Tobin’sQ appears to
be structurally below 1, although intangible capital is imperfectly accounted for,
which in principle should push it above 1. This is an area in which existing statistics
might need to be improved.
40. In particular, book-value national wealth (expressed as a fraction of na-
tional income) has increased almost as much as market-value national wealth
(see Online Appendix Figure A25), despite the increase in Tobin’s Q.
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TABLE III
GROWTH AND SAVING RATES IN RICH COUNTRIES, 1970–2010
Real growth
rate of national
income (%)
Population
growth
rate (%)
Real growth
rate of per
capita national
income (%)
Net private
saving rate
(personal +
corporate)
(% national
income)
United States 2.8 1.0 1.8 7.7
Japan 2.5 0.5 2.0 14.6
Germany 2.0 0.2 1.8 12.2
France 2.2 0.6 1.6 11.1
United Kingdom 2.2 0.3 1.9 7.3
Italy 1.9 0.3 1.6 15.0
Canada 2.8 1.1 1.7 12.1
Australia 3.2 1.4 1.7 9.9
Notes. Authors’ computations using country national accounts. Growth rates are geometric averages
and for income use chain-weighted GDP deflators. For alternative deflators, see Online Appendix Table A3
and Country Tables US.3, JP.3, and so on. 1970–2010 average saving rates are obtained by weighting
yearly saving rates by real national income.
TABLE IV
STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL SAVING, 1970–2010
Net
national
saving
(private +
government) (%)
Net private
saving
(personal +
corporate) (%)
Incl.
personal
saving (%)
Incl.
corporate
saving
(retained
earnings) (%)
Net
government
saving (%)
United States 5.2 7.7 4.6 3.1 2.4
60 40
Japan 14.6 14.6 6.8 7.8 0.0
47 53
Germany 10.2 12.2 9.4 2.9 2.1
76 24
France 9.2 11.1 9.0 2.1 1.9
81 19
United Kingdom 5.3 7.3 2.8 4.6 2.0
38 62
Italy 8.5 15.0 14.6 0.4 6.5
97 3
Canada 10.1 12.1 7.2 4.9 2.0
60 40
Australia 8.9 9.9 5.9 3.9 0.9
60 40
Notes. Authors’ computations using country national accounts. 1970–2010 averages are obtained by
weighthing yearly saving rates by real national income. The Table reads as follows: the net national
saving rate of the United States has been 5.2% of national income on average per year over 1970–2010.
The private saving rate has been 7.7%, including 4.6% (or 60% of 7.7%) of personal saving, and 3.1% (or
40% of 7.7%) of corporate saving.
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countries. In most cases they fall between 1.7% and 1.9% a year,
and given the data imperfections we face, it is unclear whether
differences of 0.1–0.2% are statistically significant. For instance,
the rankings of countries in terms of per capita growth are re-
versed if one uses consumer price indexes rather than GDP de-
flators, or if one looks at per worker rather than per capita
growth.41
In contrast, variations in population growth are large and
significant, as shown in Table III. Since 1970, population
growth has exceeded 1% per year in New World countries
(United States, Canada, Australia), and has been less than
0.5% in Europe and Japan. As a consequence, total growth
rates are about 2.5–3% in the former group, and closer to 2% in
the latter. Differences in population growth are due to differences
in both migration and fertility. Within Europe, for example, there
is a well-known gap between high fertility countries such as
France (with population growth equal to 0.5% a year) and low
fertility countries like Germany (less than 0.2% a year, with a
sharp fall at the end of the period).42
Average net-of-depreciation private saving rates also vary
widely, from 7–8% in the United States and the United
Kingdom to 14–15% in Japan and Italy, with a large group of
countries around 10–12%. In theory, one could imagine that low
population growth, aging countries have higher saving rate, be-
cause they need to accumulate more wealth for their old days.
Maybe it is not a coincidence if the two countries with the highest
private saving rate (Japan and Italy) also have low population
growth. In practice, however, saving rates seem to vary for all
sorts of reasons other than life cycle motives, probably reflecting
differences in tastes for saving, wealth accumulation, and
41. In particular, the United States and Japan both fall last in the ranking if we
deflate income by the CPI rather than the GDP deflator (see Online Appendix Table
A165). Differences in total factor productivity (TFP) growth also appear to be rela-
tively small across most rich countries. A more complete treatment of TFP growth
variations should also include differences in growth rates of work hours, human
capital investment (such as higher education spendings), and so on. It is far beyond
the scope of the present work.
42. Population growth in Japan over the 1970–2010 period appears to be
relatively large (0.5%), but it is actually much higher in 1970–1990 (0.8%) than
in 1990–2010 (0.2%). Japan is also the country with the largest fall in per capita
growth rates, from 3.6% in 1970–1990 to 0.5% in 1990–2010. See Online Appendix
Table JP.3.
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transmission,43 as well as differences in levels of trust and confi-
dence in the future.44 As a result, there is only a weakly signifi-
cant negative relationship between private saving and growth
rates at the country level, and no relationship at all when one
considers national rather than private saving (see Table IV).45
Thus, as a first approximation, productivity growth is the
same everywhere in the rich world, but fertility decisions, migra-
tion policy, and saving behavior vary widely and are largely unre-
lated to one another. These facts help us understand why national
wealth-income ratios vary so much across countries, and in par-
ticular why high-population growth New World countries tend to
have lower ratios than low-growth Europe and Japan.
V.B. Volume versus Price Effects
Table V presents our results on the decomposition of 1970–
2010 national wealth accumulation into saving and capital gains
effects.46 New savings explain the largest part of wealth accumu-
lation, but there is also a clear pattern of positive capital gains.
Take the U.S. case. National wealth was equal to 404% of na-
tional income in 1970, and is equal to 431% of national income
in 2010. National wealth has grown at an average real rate
gw¼3.0% a year. On the basis of national saving flows alone,
wealth would have grown at rate gws¼ 2.1% a year only.
We conclude that the residual capital gains–induced wealth
43. See, for example, Hayashi (1986) on Japanese tastes for bequest.
44. The effect of the rise of life expectancy on saving behavior is unclear. In
theory, rising life expectancy may have contributed to pushing saving rates
upward, but in practice the level of annuitized wealth seems to be relatively low
in a number of rich countries. In France for instance, annuitized wealth represents
less than 3% of aggregate private wealth (see Piketty 2011, Appendix A, pp. 37–38),
suggesting that this channel does not play an important role in the rise of the
wealth-income ratio. In countries with less generous pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tems, annuitized wealth can be as large as 10–20% of aggregate private wealth.
45. See also Online Appendix Figures A122 and A123. Note that in some coun-
tries a large fraction of private saving is in effect absorbed by government deficits
(more than one third in Italy in 1970–2010). Whether private saving responds to
public deficits is an important issue (e.g., it could be that Italian households would
have saved less without rising public deficits and the fear of future public finance
crisis). However, it is far beyond the scope of the present article: here we take saving
behavior—private, public, and national—as given and attempt to analyze the
extent to which these volume effects account for the evolution of wealth.
46. Here we only show the multiplicative decompositions of national wealth.
The additive decompositions yield similar conclusions; see Online Appendix Table
A101.
CAPITAL IS BACK 1285
 at London School of econom
ics on Septem
ber 15, 2014
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
growth rate q¼ ð1þgwÞð1þgwsÞ  1 has been equal to 0.8% a year on aver-
age. New savings explain 72% of the accumulation of national
wealth in the United States between 1970 and 2010, and residual
capital gains 28%.
Just like in the United States, new savings also appear to
explain around 70–80% of 1970–2010 national wealth accumula-
tion in Japan, France, and Canada, and residual capital gains
20–30%. Capital gains are larger in the United Kingdom, Italy,
and Australia.
The capital gains we compute are obtained as a residual, and
so may reflect measurement errors in addition to real valuation
effects.47 There are two main possible issues. First, it is possible
TABLE V
ACCUMULATION OF NATIONAL WEALTH IN RICH COUNTRIES, 1970–2010
National
wealth-national
income ratios (%)
Decomposition of 1970–2010
wealth growth rate (%)
Real growth
rate of
national
wealth
Savings-
induced wealth
growth rate
Capital
gains–induced
wealth
growth rate
 (1970)  (2010) gw gws¼ s q
United States 404 431 3.0 2.1 0.8
72 28
Japan 359 616 3.9 3.1 0.8
78 22
Germany 313 416 2.7 3.1 0.4
114 14
France 351 605 3.6 2.7 0.9
75 25
United Kingdom 314 523 3.5 1.5 2.0
42 58
Italy 259 609 4.1 2.6 1.5
63 37
Canada 284 412 3.8 3.4 0.4
89 11
Australia 391 584 4.2 2.5 1.6
61 39
Notes. Authors’ computations using country national accounts. Other volume changes were included in
savings-induced wealth growth rate. For full decomposition, see Online Appendix Country Tables US.4d, JP.
4d, and so on. The Table reads as follows: the real growth rate of national wealth in the United States has been
3.0% a year on average over 1970–2010. This can be decomposed into a 2.1% savings-induced wealth growth
rate (72% of 3.0%) and a 0.8% capital gains-induced wealth growth rate (28% of 3.0%).
47. In the Online Appendix, we check that the pattern of capital gains residuals
is highly correlated with capital gains on listed equities and housing coming from
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that national saving flows are underestimated because they do
not include R&D expenditure. To address this concern, we have
recomputed our wealth accumulation equations using saving
flows that include R&D. Even after we include generous R&D
estimates, in many countries the 2010 observed levels of national
wealth are still significantly larger than those predicted by 1970
wealth levels and 1970–2010 saving flows alone (Figure VII).48
Take the case of France. Predicted national wealth in 2010—on
the basis of 1970 initial national wealth and cumulated 1970–
2010 national saving including R&D—is equal to 491% of na-
tional income, while observed wealth is 605%. There is over
100% of national income in ‘‘excess wealth.’’49
Second, we might somewhat underestimate the value of
public assets in the 1970s in countries like the United
Kingdom, France, and Italy. Part of the capital gains we measure
might simply correspond to the fact that private agents have
acquired privatized assets at relatively cheap prices. From the
viewpoint of households, this is indeed a capital gain, but from
a national wealth perspective it is a pure transfer from public to
private hands, and it should be neutralized by raising the level of
1970 wealth. Whenever possible, we have attempted to count
government assets at equivalent market values throughout the
available asset price indexes (see Figures A143 to A157). Note that the capital gains
inferred from our wealth decomposition exercises are structurally lower than those
coming from equity price indexes, for a good reason. A substantial fraction of na-
tional saving takes the form of corporate retained earnings (see Table IV) and these
earnings generate structural capital gains in equity markets. Should we exclude
retained earnings from saving in the wealth accumulation equation, then we would
similarly find much larger residual capital gains (see Appendix Table A105, and
studies by Eisner 1980; Babeau 1983; Wolff and Greenwood 1992; Wolff 1999; Gale
and Sabelhaus 1999). Such capital gains, however, would be spurious, in the sense
that they correspond to the accumulation of earnings retained within corporations
to finance new investment (thereby leading to rising stock prices), rather than to a
true relative price effect.
48. R&D has been included in investment in the latest SNA guidelines (2008),
but this change has so far only been implemented in Australia. The computations
reported in Figures VII and VIII include generous estimates of R&D investment
based on the level of R&D expenditure observed in the U.S. satellite account over
the 1970–2010 period (see Online Appendix A.5.2 for a detailed discussion).
49. Saving flows might be underestimated for reasons other than R&D. Given
the limitations of national accounts (in particular regarding the measurement of
depreciation, which is discussed in Online Appendix Section A.1.2.), this possibility
cannot completely be ruled out. One would need, however, large and systematic
errors to account for the amount of excess wealth we find.
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period (including in 1970), but we might still slightly underesti-
mate 1970 government wealth levels.
In the end, in our preferred specification that includes gen-
erous R&D expenditure in saving flows, capital gains account for
about 40% on average of the 1970–2010 increase in national
wealth-income ratios n, and saving for about 60%, with a lot of
heterogeneity across countries.50 The only exception to the gen-
eral pattern of positive capital gains is Germany. Given the large
1970–2010 saving flows and low growth rates, we should observe
more wealth in 2010 than 400% of national income. There is the
equivalent of 50–100% of national income in ‘‘missing wealth.’’
V.C. Domestic versus Foreign Capital Gains
How can we explain the substantial capital gains we find on
national wealth and the losses in the case of Germany? To ad-
dress this question, it is useful to distinguish capital gains/losses
on domestic assets and on net external wealth (Table VI). Our
series suggest a number of interpretations, but we stress that
data limitations make it impossible to rigorously estimate the
exact role played by each of them.
FIGURE VII
Observed versus Predicted National Wealth-National Income Ratios (2010)
50. See Online Appendix A.5.2 and Appendix Table A99.
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All countries (except Germany) have experienced positive
capital gains on domestic wealth. These gains have been particu-
larly large in Europe and mostly (though not entirely) driven by
housing. One hypothesis—which, as we shall see, is consistent
with the historical data—is that countries like the United
Kingdom and France have benefited from a long-run asset price
recovery. Asset prices fell substantially between 1910 and 1950,
and have been rising ever since. There might, however, have been
some overshooting in the recovery process, particularly in hous-
ing prices. The four countries with the largest capital gains—
United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Australia—have by far the
largest level of housing wealth in our sample: over 300% of na-
tional income in 2010, a level that was only attained by Japan
around 1990. So part of the capital gains we measure might owe
to abnormally high real estate prices in 2010.
To a large extent, the housing bubble explanation for the rise
of wealth-income ratios is complementary to the real explanation.
In countries like France and Italy, savings are sufficiently large
relative to growth to generate a significant increase in the na-
tional wealth-income ratio: given the values taken by s and g over
the 1970–2010 period and the steady-state formula n¼ sg, the n
observed in 1970 were too low and had to increase. If in addition
households in these countries have a particularly strong taste for
domestic assets like real estate (or do not want to diversify their
TABLE VI
NATIONAL WEALTH ACCUMULATION IN RICH COUNTRIES: DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN
CAPITAL GAINS
1970–2010 capital
gains on national wealth
(% of 2010 national income)
Decomposition of 1970-2010
capital gains (%)
Domestic
wealth
Foreign
wealth
United States 105 72 33
Japan 27 45 18
Germany 25 3 22
France 164 179 15
United Kingdom 235 217 18
Italy 213 240 27
Canada 63 55 7
Australia 220 178 41
Notes. Authors’ computations using country national accounts. Other volume changes were put in
saving flows and thus excluded from capital gains.
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portfolio internationally as much as they could) then maybe it is
not too surprising if this generates upward pressure on housing
prices.
Regarding the atypical German capital losses, German stat-
isticians might overestimate saving flows, underestimate the cur-
rent stock of wealth, or both. Yet another possibility is that
Germany has not experienced any asset price recovery so far be-
cause the German legal system still gives important control
rights over private assets to stakeholders other than private
property owners. Rent controls, for instance, may have prevented
the market value of real estate from increasing as much as in
other countries. Voting rights granted to employee representa-
tives in corporate boards may similarly reduce the market
value of corporations.51 Germans might also have less taste for
expensive capital goods (particularly housing) than do the
French, the British, and the Italians, maybe because they have
less taste for living in a large centralized capital city and prefer a
more polycentric country, for historical and cultural reasons.
With the data at our disposal, we are not able to put a precise
number on each explanation.
It is interesting to note, however, that when we compute a
European average wealth accumulation equation—by taking a
weighted average of Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
and Italy—then capital gains and losses seem to partly wash
out (Figure VIII). Europe as a whole has less residual capital
gains than the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, thanks to
Germany. Had we regional U.S. balance sheets at our disposal,
maybe we would find regional asset price variations within the
United States that would not be too different from those we find in
Europe. One possibility is that substantial relative asset price
movements happens permanently within small national or re-
gional economic units, but tend to correct themselves at more
aggregate levels. If that is the case, German asset prices might
rise in the near future and fall in other European countries.
Turning now to net foreign assets, we find that capital gains
and losses on external portfolios have played a large role in the
51. Whether this is good or bad for productive efficiency is a complex issue that
we do not address here (at first sight, low-equity values do not seem to prevent
German firms from producing good products). In this ‘‘stakeholder’’ view of the
firm, the market value of corporations can be interpreted as the value for capital
owners, whereas the book value can be interpreted as the value for all stakeholders.
Both views have their merits.
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overall dynamics of national wealth (Table VI). The U.S. and
German cases are particularly striking. In the Unite dStates,
net capital gains on cross-border portfolios represent one third
of total capital gains at the national level. Absent net foreign
gains, the U.S. wealth-income ratio would not have increased at
all since 1970.52 In Germany virtually all capital losses at the
national level can be attributed to foreign assets.
The reason capital gains on foreign portfolios matter so much
is that the gross foreign positions of countries have massively
increased since the 1970s—the rise has been spectacular in
Europe, a bit less so in the world’s largest economies, the
United States and Japan.53 A significant share of each country’s
FIGURE VIII
Observed versus Predicated National Wealth–National Income Ratios (2010)
52. Our results on U.S. external wealth capital gains are consistent with the
findings of Gourinchas and Rey (2007). What we add to this line of work is a global
macro perspective that includes the accumulation of both domestic and foreign
capital. Note that we include all ‘‘other volume changes’’ in saving flows but exclude
R&D from saving. We provide detailed accumulation results isolating saving,
‘‘other volume changes.’’ and capital gains in the country-specific tables of the
Online Appendix.
53. In 2010, gross assets held in France by the rest of the world amount to about
310% of national income, whereas gross assets held by French residents in the rest
of the world amount to about 300% of national (hence a negative position of
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domestic capital is now owned by other countries. With huge
gross positions, even moderate returns differentials on cross-
border assets and liabilities are enough to generate large and
volatile gains and losses on net foreign wealth over time and
across countries.
VI. Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1870–2010
It is impossible to properly understand the recent rise of
wealth-income ratios in rich countries without putting the
1970–2010 period into a longer historical perspective. As we
have seen, on average about 40% of the rise of n since the
1970s is due to capital gains, with large differences between coun-
tries. The key question is the following: is this due to a structural,
long-run rise in the relative price of assets (caused, for instance,
by uneven technical progress), or is it a recovery effect? We argue
that it is mostly a recovery effect: the 1970–2010 capital gains
largely seem to compensate the capital losses observed during
earlier parts of the twentieth century.
The argument relies on the analysis of the evolution of
wealth-income ratios over the 1870–2010 period. Due to data
limitations, our long-term analysis is restricted to four countries:
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France.
The key descriptive statistics are the following. For the three
European countries, we find a similar U-shaped pattern: today’s
private wealth-national income ratios appear to be returning to
the high values observed in 1870–1910, namely, about 600%–
700% (Figure II). For the United States, the U-shaped pattern
is much less strong (Figure IV). In addition, European public
wealth–national income ratios have followed an inverted
U-curve over the past century.54 But the magnitude of the pat-
tern for public wealth is very limited compared to the U-shape
evolution of private wealth, so that European national wealth-
income ratios are strongly U-shaped, too. Last, in 1900–1910,
about –10%, in the official data). For the United States, recorded gross foreign
assets amount to about 120% of national income, and gross liabilities to about
100% of national. See Online Appendix Figures A39–A42.
54. Net public wealth was significantly positive (around 100% of national
income) during the 1950s–1970s, due to large public assets and low debt. Since
then, public wealth has returned to the low level observed on the eve of World
War I.
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European countries held a very large positive net foreign asset
position—around 100% of national income on average.
Interestingly, the net foreign position of Europe has again
turned (slightly) positive in 2000–2010, when the national
wealth-income ratio again exceeded that of the United States.
Starting with this set of facts, and using the best historical
estimates of saving and growth rates, we have estimated detailed
1870–2010 wealth accumulation equations. As Table VII shows,
the total accumulation of national wealth over this 140-year-long
period seems to be well accounted for by saving flows. To fully
reconcile the stock and flow data, we need a small residual capital
gain for the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, and
a small residual capital loss for Germany. But in all cases saving
flows account for the bulk of wealth accumulation: capital gains
seem to wash out in the long run.55
Looking at each subperiod, we find a strong U-shaped rela-
tive capital price effect in European countries. The United
Kingdom, for example, experienced real capital losses at a rate
of 1.9% per year between 1910 and 1950, followed by real gains
of +0.9% between 1950 and 1980 and +2.4% between 1980 and
2010. The pattern is similar for France. In these two countries,
there seems to have been a slight overshooting in the recovery
process, in the sense that the total cumulated relative asset price
effect over the 1910–2010 period appears to be somewhat positive
(+0.2% per year in the United Kingdom, +0.3% in France). In
Germany, by contrast, the recovery is yet to come (–0.8% between
1910 and 2010).
We emphasize that the imperfections of our data do not allow
us to put a precise number on asset over- or undervaluation in
2010. In any multisector model with uneven technical change
between capital and consumption goods, one should expect cap-
ital gains and losses that could vary between countries (for in-
stance, depending on comparative advantage). The residual
capital gains we estimate might also reflect measurement
issues: 1870–2010 saving flows might be somewhat underesti-
mated in the United Kingdom and France and overestimated in
Germany. At a modest level, our point is simply that the one-good
capital accumulation model seems to do a relatively good job in
55. These results are robust to a wide range of specifications. Online Appendix
Tables A108 to A137 present the complete decomposition results, for each country
and sector of the economy, for both the additive and multiplicative models.
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TABLE VII
ACCUMULATION OF NATIONAL WEALTH: UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY,
FRANCE, 1870–2010
Market-value national
wealth-national income
ratios (%)
Real growth
rate of national
wealth (%)
Savings-induced
wealth growth
rate (incl. war
destructions) (%)
Capital
gains–induced
wealth growth
rate (%)
t t+n gw gws¼ s/ q
Panel A: United States
1870–2010 413 431 3.4 2.6 0.8
76 24
1870–1910 413 469 4.3 2.9 1.4
68 32
1910–2010 469 431 3.1 2.5 0.6
80 20
1910–1950 469 380 2.7 2.2 0.5
82 18
1950–1980 380 434 4.0 3.7 0.2
94 6
1980–2010 434 431 2.7 1.6 1.1
58 42
Panel B: United Kingdom
1870–2010 656 527 1.8 1.5 0.3
83 17
1870–1910 656 694 2.1 1.7 0.4
79 21
1910–2010 719 527 1.6 1.4 0.2
86 14
1910–1950 719 241 1.3 0.6 1.9
43 143
1950–1980 241 416 4.0 3.0 0.9
76 24
1980–2010 416 527 3.4 1.0 2.4
28 72
Panel C: Germany
1870–2010 745 416 2.0 2.6 0.6
128 28
1870–1910 745 637 2.1 2.3 0.1
107 7
1910–2010 637 416 2.0 2.8 0.8
137 37
1910–1950 637 223 1.4 0.0 1.5
3 103
1950–1980 223 330 6.3 6.8 0.5
108 8
1980–2010 330 416 2.5 2.5 0.0
101 1
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the long run, and that the stock and flow sides of historical na-
tional accounts are roughly consistent with one another.
Table VIII decomposes the huge decline in national wealth-
income ratios that occurred in Europe between 1910 and 1950. In
the United Kingdom, war destructions play a negligible role—an
estimated 4% of the total decline in n. Low national saving ac-
counts for 46% of the fall in n and negative valuation effects
(including losses on foreign portfolios) for the remaining 50%.
In France and Germany, cumulated physical war destructions
account for about one quarter of the fall in n. Low national
saving and real capital losses each explain about half of the re-
maining three quarters. Interestingly, the private wealth-
national income ratio has declined less in the United Kingdom
than in France and Germany between 1910 and 1950, but the
reverse holds for the national wealth-income ratio (due to the
large negative U.K. public wealth around 1950).56
TABLE VII
(CONTINUED)
Market-value national
wealth-national income
ratios (%)
Real growth
rate of national
wealth (%)
Savings-induced
wealth growth
rate (incl. war
destructions) (%)
Capital
gains–induced
wealth growth
rate (%)
t t+n gw gws¼ s/ q
Panel D: France
1870–2010 689 605 2.0 1.8 0.2
91 9
1870–1910 689 747 1.3 1.4 0.0
103 3
1910–2010 747 605 2.2 2.0 0.3
89 11
1910–1950 747 261 1.2 0.1 1.1
8 92
1950–1980 261 383 5.9 4.7 1.2
80 20
1980–2010 383 605 3.4 2.2 1.2
65 35
Notes. The real growth rate of national wealth has been 3.1% a year in the United States between
1910 and 2010. This can be decomposed into a 2.5% savings-induced growth rate and a 0.6% residual term
(capital gains and/or measurement errors). Savings account for 80% of wealth accumulation and the
residual term for 20%. Authors’ computations using country national accounts. War destructions and
other volume changes were included in savings-induced wealth growth rate. For full decomposition, see
Online Appendix Country Tables US.4c, DE.4c, and so on.
56. U.K. net public wealth then turned positive during the 1950s–1960s. See
Online Appendix Figures A16 and A22.
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The U.S. case is again fairly different from that of Europe.
The fall of n during the 1910–1950 period was more modest, and
so was the recovery since 1950. Regarding capital gains, we find
in every subperiod a small but positive relative price effect. The
capital gain effect becomes bigger in the recent decades and lar-
gely derives from the U.S. foreign portfolio—it seems too big to be
accounted for by underestimated saving and investment flows.
VII. The Changing Nature of National Wealth, 1700–2010
VII.A. The Changing Nature of Wealth in Old Europe
What do we know about the evolution of wealth-income ratios
prior to 1870? In the United Kingdom—the country with the
most comprehensive historical balance sheets—the national
wealth-income ratio appears to have been roughly stable
around 650–700% during the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries (Figure III). In France, where a large number of historical
national wealth estimates were also established, the picture is
similar (Figure IX).
TABLE VIII
ACCUMULATION OF NATIONAL WEALTH IN RICH COUNTRIES, 1910–1950
National
wealth-national
income ratios (%)
Decomposition of 1950 national
wealth-national income ratio (%)
 (1910)  (1950)
Initial
wealth
effect
Cumulated
new
savings
Cumulated
war
destructions
Capital
gains or
losses
United States 469 380 132 193 0 55
Germany 637 223 400 109 120 165
31 29 40
France 747 261 421 144 132 172
38 27 35
United Kingdom 719 208 409 75 19 256
46 4 50
Notes. Germany’s national wealth-income ratio fell from 637% to 223% between 1910 and 1950. On
the basis of Germany’s 1910 wealth-income ratio and cumulated 1910–1950 saving, the wealth-income
ratio should have been 400% + 109%¼ 509% in 1950. But Germany experienced the equivalent of 120% of
national income in war destructions and 165% in capital losses, so that the 1950 wealth-income ratio
was only 223%. Maintaining the 1910 wealth-income ratio would have required 637% – 509%¼128% of
national income in additional cumulated saving over 1910–1950. Thirty-one percent of the fall in the
wealth-income ratio can thus be attributed to insufficient saving, 29% to war destructions, and 40% to
real capital losses.
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We should make clear that the raw data sources available for
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are insufficient to pre-
cisely compare the levels of wealth-income ratios between the two
countries or between the various subperiods. But the general pat-
tern seems robust: all estimates, coming from many different au-
thors using independent methodologies, provide the same orders
of magnitude. National wealth always seems to be between six
and eight years of national income from 1700 to 1914 in both
countries, with no obvious long-run trend.
Strikingly, today’s wealth-income ratios in the United
Kingdom and France seem relatively close to their eighteenth-
century levels, in spite of considerable changes in the nature of
wealth. Agricultural land—including land improvement of all
sorts—was between four and five years of national income
around 1700; it is now negligible and has been replaced by hous-
ing and other domestic capital (offices, machines, patents, etc.). In
the long run, the decline of the share of agricultural land in na-
tional wealth mirrors that of the share of agriculture in national
income, from over two thirds in the eighteenth century to a few
percent today—with a faster and earlier decline in the United
Kingdom. The variations in the share of net foreign assets in na-
tional wealth are also striking. Net foreign assets were virtually
zero in the eighteenth century. They reached very high levels in
FIGURE IX
The Changing Nature of National Wealth: France, 1700–2010
National wealth¼ agricultural land + housing + other domestic capital
goods + net foreign assets
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the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—almost two
years of national income in the United Kingdom in 1910, over
one year in France. Following the wars and the collapse of the
colonial empires, they came back to virtually zero around 1950.
Why were wealth-income ratios so high in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, and why do they seem to be approaching
these levels again in the twenty-first century? A natural explan-
ation lies in the ¼ sg steady-state formula. With slow growth,
even moderate saving rates lead to large wealth-income ratios.
Growth was low until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
and is likely to be low again in the twenty-first century as popu-
lation growth vanishes, thereby potentially generating high
ratios again.
That is probably an important part of the explanation.
Unfortunately, data limitations again make it difficult to evalu-
ate the exact role played by alternative explanations, such as
structural capital gains and losses and changes in the value of
natural resources.
The main difficulty is that pre-1870 estimates of saving and
investment flows are too fragile to be used in wealth accumula-
tion decompositions. With very low growth, any error in the net-
of-depreciation saving rate s can make a big difference in terms of
predicted steady-state wealth-income ratio ¼ sg. In preindustrial
societies where g& 0.5–1%, whether the net saving rate is s¼5%
or s¼ 8% is going to matter a lot. Historical estimates suggest
that there was substantial investment going on in traditional
societies, including in the rural sector. Annual spendings on
land improvement (drainage, irrigation, afforestation, etc.)
alone could be as large as 3–4% of national income. This suggests
that a large fraction of total agricultural land value in eighteenth-
century United Kingdom and France actually derived from past
investment. In all likelihood, the ‘‘pure land value’’ (i.e., the value
of land before any improvement, as it was discovered at prehis-
toric times) was much less than four years of national income.
Some eighteenth-century estimates tend to suggest that it was
around one year of national income.57 Saving and investment
57. See in particular the famous estimates by Thomas Paine (1795), who sug-
gested in front of the French National Assembly to confiscate the ‘‘pure land’’ com-
ponent of inheritance, which he estimated to be about one year of national income.
On saving and investment series covering the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
particularly for the United Kingdom and France, see the Data Appendix.
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series are unfortunately not sufficiently reliable to definitively
address the question. The residual ‘‘pure land’’ value could be
less than 0.5 year, or up to 1.5 years of national income.
VII.B. The Nature of Wealth: Old Europe versus the New World
To make some progress on this question, it is useful to com-
pare the value of land in Old Europe (United Kingdom, France,
Germany) and in the New World. For the United States, we have
put together historical balance sheets starting around 1770
(Figure X). We find that the value of agricultural land in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was much less
in the United States (one to two years of national income) than
in Old Europe (three to four years).58 Part of the explanation
could well be lower accumulated investment relative to economic
and population growth in the New World (i.e., a lower cumulated
s
g ratio). However, available evidence suggests that the relatively
low New World wealth-income ratios can also be explained by a
‘‘land abundance’’ effect. Land was so abundant in America that
its price per acre was low. The right model to think about this
effect involves a production function with an elasticity of substi-
tution between land and labor lower than 1—a necessary condi-
tion for the price effect to dominate the volume effect.
To see this, think of a two-good model of the form introduced
in Section III.B. That is, assume that the capital good solely con-
sists of land and that land volume Vt (measured in acres) is in
fixed supply: Vt¼V. For the sake of simplicity, assume that no
land improvement is possible. The market value of land if given
by K¼ qV, where q is the price of land relative to the consumption
good. The production function Y¼F(V,L) transforms capital
(land volume) V and labor L into output Y. Assume that F(V,L)
is a CES function with elasticity , and that there is zero prod-
uctivity and population growth.
Consider two countries 0 and 1 with similar technology and
preferences. Assume country 1 (America) has more land volume
relative to labor than country 0 (Old Europe): V1L1 >
V0
L0
. Then
58. For the long-run evolution of wealth composition in Germany and Canada,
see Online Appendix Figures A46 and A47. The German pattern is close to that of
the United Kingdom and France (except that the net foreign asset position of
Germany around 1900–1910 is less strongly positive than in the two colonial
powers). The Canadian pattern is close to that of the United States (except that
net foreign asset position is strongly negative throughout the nineteenth century
and much of the twentieth century).
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country 1 will end up with lower land value (relative to in-
come) than country 0 (i.e., 1 < 0, with 1¼ K1Y1 ¼
q1V1
Y1
and
0¼ K0Y0 ¼
q0V0
Y0
) if and only if the elasticity of substitution  is less
than 1. This result directly follows from the fact that the capital
share  is smaller in the land-abundant country (i.e.,
1¼FV V1Y1 < 0¼FV
V0
Y0
) if and only if  is less than 1. Under stand-
ard assumptions on preferences and equilibrium rates of return,
this in turn implies that land value is lower in the land-abundant
country: 1 < 0.
59
Intuitively, an elasticity of substitution  < 1 means that
there is not much that one can do with capital when there is too
much of it. The marginal product of land falls to very low levels
FIGURE X
The Changing Nature of Wealth: United States, 1770–2010
National wealth¼ agricultural land + housing + other domestic capital
goods + net foreign assets
59. In a dynastic utility model with zero growth, the rate of return is set by the
rate of time preference (r¼ ), so that 1¼ 1r < 0¼ 0r . With a bequest-in-the-utility-
function modelUðc; bÞ¼c1sbs, the wealth-income ratio is set by ¼ sð1sÞ, so that the
difference in capital share entirely translates into a difference in rates of return:
r1¼ 1 < r0¼ 0 . However to the extent that the interest elasticity of saving s¼ s(r) is
positive, this also implies 1 < 0. A similar intuition applies to the case with
Uðc; bÞ¼c1sbs (assuming positive population or productivity growth so as to
obtain a well-defined steady-state ¼ sg). See the working paper version, Piketty
and Zucman (2013).
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when a few million individuals own an entire continent. The price
effect dominates the volume effect. It is exactly what one should
expect to happen in a relatively low-tech economy where there is
a limited set of things that one can do with capital.
Thus, part of the initial difference in  between Europe and
America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries seems to be
due to a relative price effect (due to land abundance) rather than
to a pure saving effect (via the ¼ sg formula). Both logic actually
tend to reinforce each other: the lower land prices and higher
wage rates attracted labor to the New World, implying large
population growth rates and relatively low steady-state ¼ sg
ratios.60
The lower land values prevailing in America during the
1770–1860 period were to some extent compensated by the slav-
ery system. Land was so abundant that it was almost worthless,
implying that it was difficult to be really rich by owning land.
However, the landed elite could control a large share of national
income by owning the labor force. Should a tiny elite own the
entire labor force, the total value of the slave stock could in prin-
ciple be very large, say, as large as 20 years of national income
(assuming the labor share is 100% of output and the rate of return
is equal to 5%).61 In the case of the antebellum United States, the
situation was less extreme, but the value of the slave stock was
still highly significant. By putting together the best available es-
timates of slave prices and the number of slaves, we have come to
the conclusion that the market value of slaves was between one
60. There is a large historical literature on the factor flows that characterized
the nineteenth-century Atlantic economy. To explain why both labor and capital
flew to the New World, one needs to introduce a three-factor production function
(see, e.g., Taylor and Williamson 1994; O’Rourke and Williamson 2005). One could
also argue that transatlantic differences in land value (rural, urban, and suburban)
still matter today. However they go together with different tastes over housing in
city centers versus suburban areas, so that it is difficult to disentangle the various
effects. The fact that the bulk of 1870–2010 wealth accumulation is well explained
by volume effects—both in Europe and in the United States—suggests that today’s
differences in pure land values are less central than they used to be.
61. With a one-good model and a Cobb-Douglas production function
FðK;LÞ¼KL1, the market value H of the human capital stock (i.e., the value
of the labor force from the viewpoint of a potential slave owner) is always equal to
ð1Þ
 times the nonhuman capital stock. If ¼ 13, then H¼ 2. This is assuming
that the slave owner equates returns across all human and nonhuman assets.
With a CES production function FðK;LÞ¼ðaK 1 þ ð1 aÞL1 Þ 1, we have
H¼ 1a
1
  .
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and two years of national income for the entire United States, and
up to three years of income in Southern states. When we add up
slaves and land values, wealth-income ratios in the U.S. South
are relatively close to those of the Old World. Slaves approxi-
mately compensate the lower price of land (Figure XI).
Obviously, this peculiar form of wealth has little to do
with ‘‘national’’ wealth and is better analyzed in terms of appro-
priation and power relationship than in terms of saving and
accumulation. We view these ‘‘augmented’’ national balance
sheets as a way to illustrate the ambiguous relationship of the
New World with wealth and inequality. To some extent, ante-
bellum America is the land of equal opportunity, the place
where past wealth does not matter much. But it is also the
place where a new form of class structure—even more extreme
than Europe’s—flourished, whereby part of the population owned
another part.62
VIII. Capital Shares and the Changing Nature of
Technology
In this section we attempt a brief look at the implications of
our new data on capital for understanding the evolution of factor
shares and the shape of the production function. The results
should be taken with caution, because measuring factor shares
raises many difficulties. But this question is so important that we
feel it deserves a few words.
Starting first with the recent decades, Figure XII shows
that capital shares have increased in all rich countries from
about 15–25% in the 1970s to 25–35% in 2010, with large vari-
ations over time and across countries.63 By our estimates, how-
ever, capital-output ratios k have risen even more than capital
shares , so that the average return to domestic capital r—which
can be computed as k —has declined somewhat (Figure XIII).
64
62. During the 1770–1860 period, slaves made as much as 15–20% of total U.S.
population (up to 40% in Southern states). See Online Appendix Table US.3b.
63. Our results are consistent with a growing literature on the global rise of
capital shares since the 1970s (Ellis and Smith 2007; Azmat, Manning, and Van
Reenen 2011; Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014).
64. Remember that domestic capital K is national wealth W minus the net for-
eign asset position. The capital-output ratio k is the ratio of domestic capital K to
domestic output Yd. The capital share  is equal to the output YK generated by
domestic capital divided by Yd. So it is pure accounting that the average return to
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This decline is what one would expect in any model: when there is
more capital, the rate of return to capital must go down. The
interesting question is whether it falls more or less than the
quantity of capital. According to our data it has fallen less, imply-
ing a rising capital share.
There are several ways to think about this piece of evidence.
One can think of a model with imperfect competition and an in-
crease in the bargaining power of capital (e.g., due to globaliza-
tion and increasing capital mobility). A production function with
three factors—capital and high-skill and low-skill labor—where
capital is more strongly complementary with skilled than with
unskilled labor would also do, if there is a rise in skills or skill-
biased technical change. Yet another—and more parsimonious—
way to explain the rise in  is a standard two-factor CES
FIGURE XI
National Wealth in 1770–1810: Old World versus New World
domestic capital, r¼ YKK , is equal to the capital share YKYd divided by the capital-output
ratio KYd. Note that the results on Figure XII are robust to the various ways of taking
into account government capital and interest payment in these computations,
which are discussed in Online Appendix A.7.5. The reader should have in mind
that like all our income series, the capital shares displayed in Figure XII are net of
depreciation.
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FIGURE XII
Capital Shares in Factor-Price National Income, 1975–2010
FIGURE XIII
Average Return on Private Wealth, 1975–2010
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production function F(K,L) with an elasticity of substitution
 > 1.65 Importantly, with large changes in the capital-output
ratio k (which in the long run seem to be mostly due to volume
rather relative price effects),66 one can obtain substantial move-
ments in the capital share with a production function that is only
moderately more flexible than the standard Cobb-Douglas. For
instance, with ¼1.5, the capital share rises from ¼ 28% to
¼ 36% if k jumps from 2.5 to 5, which is roughly what has
happened in rich countries since the 1970s. The capital share
would reach ¼42% in case further capital accumulation takes
place and k attains 8. In case the production function becomes
even more flexible over time (say, ¼ 1.8), the capital share would
then be as large as ¼ 53%.67
65. One can of course combine the various possible explanations.
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), for instance, use a two-goods model in which
there is a decline in the relative price of investment. As a result, firms shift away
from labor toward capital, and with an elasticity of substitution  larger than 1 the
capital share  increases. As the two-goods model we apply in Section VII.B to the
nineteenth-century United States andEurope illustrates, when the relative price of
investment is lower (e.g., lower land values) and  > 1, the wealth-income ratio has
to be higher. Thus, the explanation for the rise in  put forward by Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2014) is consistent with our findings of rising . The difference is that
we do not need a two-goods model to account for the rise in : in a broad class of one-
good general equilibrium models, when g decreases  increases, and when in add-
ition  > 1,has to rise. In the real world, both forces (lower gand declining relative
price of some capital goods) probably play a role in the dynamics of , so the two
explanations should be seen as complementary. One problem, however, with the
declining relative price of capital story is that while the price of corporate tangible
fixed assets may have declined, taking a broader view of capital we actually find a
positive relative price effect over 1970–2010 (see Section V). This could be due to a
positive price effect for land and R&D assets, which are not included in standard
measures of the relative price of capital.
66. Our market-value domestic capital stock K can be viewed as
K¼q1V1 þ    þ qnVn, where V1; . . .;Vn are the volumes of the various capital
assets (land, housing, structures, machines, patents, . . . ) and q1; . . .; qn their
market prices (relatively to the consumption price index). With a single capital
good in fixed supply (e.g., pure land), it makes more sense to view the production
function as Y¼F(V,L) (see Section VII.B). With many capital goods, the market-
value concept of capital stockK is the most natural definition, especially given that
the aggregate relative capital price q seems to be close to 1 in the very long run;
otherwise one might want to use V¼ Kq . In any case, for reasons already explained,
the best way to use available data is to start from market-value balance sheets and
compute the implicit q from wealth decomposition equations.
67. In a perfectly competitive model with Y¼FðK;LÞ¼ðaK 1 þ ð1 aÞL1 Þ 1,
the rate of return is given by r¼FK¼a1= (with ¼ KY), and the capital share is
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This scenario will not necessarily happen, but it cannot be
entirely excluded either. Capital-output ratios and capital shares
have no strong reason to be constant. Since domestic saving rates
s and output growth rates g vary for all sorts of reasons over time
and across countries, it is natural to expect k to vary widely.
Small departures from standard Cobb-Douglas assumptions
then imply that the capital share ¼ rk can also vary substan-
tially. It is natural to imagine that  was much less than 1 in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and became larger than 1 in
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. One expects a higher
elasticity of substitution in high-tech economies where there are
lots of alternative uses and forms for capital.68
Taking now a very long-run perspective on the evolution of
factor shares, there seems to be evidence—in both the United
Kingdom and France—that the capital share was somewhat
larger in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (around
40%) than it is in the early twenty-first century (about 30%),
despite the recent rise (Figure XIV). Will capital shares re-
turn to their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century levels? The
capital-output ratio k is still somewhat lower today than in
the distant past. One possibility is that the capital share 
will slowly return to about 40% as k keeps increasing in the
coming decades. However, it could also be that the labor expo-
nent in the production function has declined since the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, because of the rise of human
capital. Over time, human inputs may have become relatively
more important than capital inputs in the production process.
With the data we have at our disposal, we are not able to say.
The long-run U.K. and French data, however, suggest that if
such a ‘‘rise of human capital’’ happened, it was probably rela-
tively modest.
We stress that our discussion of capital shares and produc-
tion functions should be viewed as merely exploratory and illus-
trative. In many ways, it is more difficult to measure capital
given by¼r¼a1 . Witha¼ 0.21 and ¼1:5; goes from 28% to 36% and 42% as
rises from 2.5 to 5 and 8. With ¼1:8;  rises to 53% if ¼ 8.
68. The fact that the capital sharewas low in the mid-twentieth century (when
kwas also low) can also be viewed as evidence for > 1. Indeed,andkmove in the
same direction if  > 1, and in opposite directions if  < 1.
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shares  than capital-output ratios k. The measurement of —
and therefore of the average rate of return to capital—is compli-
cated by self-employment and tax optimization behaviors of
business owners (a growing concern in a number of countries),
by the measurement of housing product (which is not fully homo-
geneous internationally), and also by the problem of informal fi-
nancial intermediation. National accounts deduct from the
return to capital the costs of intermediation services provided
by banks and real estate agents, but not the time spent by capital
owners to manage their portfolios. Such costs might well vary
over time. They might be larger in fast-growing economies
rather than in the stagnant, rural economies of the eighteenth
century. So we may overestimate average rates of return when
using national accounts capital income flow series (and the r¼ k
formula), especially in high-growth economies. In this article, we
have tried to show that an alternative way to study the relative
importance of capital and labor in the economy is to study the
evolution of  rather than the evolution of —which so far has
been the focus of most of the attention. Ideally, both evolutions
need to be analyzed together.
FIGURE XIV
Factor Shares in Factor-Price National Income, 1820–2010: United Kingdom
and France
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IX. Conclusion
The new wealth-income database introduced in this article
reveals some striking facts. Capital is making a comeback: in the
top eight developed economies, aggregate wealth has risen from
about 200–300% of national income in 1970 to a range of 400–
600% today. In effect, today’s wealth-income ratios appear to be
returning to the high values observed in eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries Europe—namely, 600–700%—in spite of consid-
erable changes in the nature of wealth. The low European ratios
of the postwar decades thus appear to be a historical anomaly.
With low growth and substantial saving, long-run  can naturally
be very high—600–700%, or even more.
A full understanding of the implications of the return of high-
wealth income ratios calls for at least three extensions. It would
be good to study wealth-income ratios at the world level, include
individual-level wealth inequality in the analysis, and decompose
wealth into an inherited component on the one hand and a self-
made component on the other. All of this raises important chal-
lenges for future research.
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